

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 OES-09 PM-05 CIAE-00 INR-10
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 SOE-02
DODE-00 DOE-15 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 H-01 PA-01
/118 W

-----046419 071732Z /46

R 070936Z JUL 78
FM AMCONSUL BOMBAY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8395
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BOMBAY 1652

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, IN
SUBJ: NUCLEAR MATTERS

REF: STATE 169808

1. SUMMARY. ON JULY 6 I REVIEWED SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL WITH IAEC CHAIRMAN SETHNA WHO ALSO GAVE ME HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE NEW YORK TALKS OF JUNE 9 ON SAFEGUARDS. SETHNA SHOWED NO SIGNS OF PIQUE OR WHATEVER IT WAS THAT LED HIM TO AVOID CONGEN FOR MONTH FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM THE U.S. IN FACT, HE WAS MORE WILLING THEN USUAL TO GO INTO DETAILS OF DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH TO NON-PROLIFERATION. HE HOPED THAT A CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL TALKS WOULD REVEAL WAYS TO AVOID COLLISION WHICH HE SAYS SO OFTEN SEEMS INEVITABLE. END SUMMARY.

2. SETHNA THANKED DEPARTMENT FOR CONFIRMATION THAT 60-DAY WAITING PERIOD WILL EXPIRE ON JULY 15. HE WAS ALSO GLAD TO LEARN THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO PERMIT EARLY SHIPMENT OF UF6. HE HAD FEARED THAT NEWNESS OF THE PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZATION OF THESE EXPORTS MIGHT GIVE RISE TO FURTHER DELAY.

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3. HE ALSO APPRIECATED THE NON-PAPER CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFTEL. HE REGARDED THIS AS VAN DOREN'S RESONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF KEY POINTS OF NEW U.S. LAW. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STUDY THE PAPER IN DETAIL BEFORE RESPONDING BUT OBSERVED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 307 WOULD

BE AWFULLY DIFFICULT FOR ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT BECAUSE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION SUGGESTS THAT TERMINATION OF SUPPLIES COULD BE INVOKED BY U.S. AT ALMOST ANY TIME. HE SAID HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS CONSIDERED REACTION IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS LAWYERS.

4. SETHNA ALSO SAID HE WOULD GIVE US ANY IDEAS HE COULD DEVELOP TO MEET THE POINT IN SENATOR SPARKMAN'S LETTER ABOUT SAFEGUARDING HEAVY WATER. HE HAS IN PAST INDICATED IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO PUT INTO SAFEGUARDED FACILITY AN AMOUNT OF HEAVY WATER EQUIVALENT TO THE TOTAL RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A PROBLEM IN FULLY MEETING SENATOR SPARKMAN'S REQUEST AS INDIANS BELIEVE THAT IT IS CANADA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SAFEGUARD AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THE HEAVY WATER CONTRIBUTED BY U.S. FOR INITIAL CHARGE OF RAPP I.

5. WHILE TALKING ABOUT HEAVY WATER SETHNA REMARKED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP IN NEW YORK REGARDING PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEW DELHI OFFER OF ADDITIONAL HEAVY WATER. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT THE INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WILL MEET IN NEW DELHI ON JULY 12 AT WHICH TIME HE WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE IT FINALIZE ITS POSITION ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S OFFER. HE THINKS
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THAT THE COMMISSION WILL AGREE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN INDIA'S INTEREST TO PURSUE THIS OFFER FURTHER BUT CAUTIONED THAT SOME MEMBERS MAY WANT HIM TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH THE U.S. IN VIEW OF INDIA'S CONTINUING SHORTAGE OF HEAVY WATER.

6. IN GIVING HIS IMPRESSIONS OF JUNE 9 NEW YORK TALKS SETHNA SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SAY THERE WAS DISCERNIBLE PROGRESS IN NARROWING GAP IN APPROACHES TO NON-PROLIFERATION. HOWEVER HE THOUGHT THAT THE MEETING HAD BROUGHT ABOUT SOME CLARIFICATION OF DIFFERENCES IN VIEW WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY SOME AVENUES OFFERING HOPE OF PROGRESS. HE WAS GLAD THAT TALKS HAD BEEN JOINED AND ASKED WHETHER HE COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE SOON A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR RENEGOTIATION OF BILATERALS. I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING DEPARTMENT NOW BELIEVES THAT UNTIL THERE IS A MEETING OF MINDS ON SAFEGUARDS IT WOULD NOT BE FRUITFUL TO START TALKING ABOUT LANGUAGE FOR A REVISED BILATERAL.

7. I OBSERVED THAT SOME PRESS REPORTS GIVE IMPRESSION

THAT THE INDIA SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY WITH HIM AS ITS PRINCIPAL
SPOKESMAN IS PRINCIPAL BARRIER TO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS.
SETHNA SAID THAT SUCH A CONCLUSION IS WRONG BECAUSE
SAFEGUARDS ARE ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL ISSUE. IF A
TRULY NON-DISCRIMINATORY SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS CAN
BE EVOLVED THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY WOULD GO ALONG
WITH TIME. HOWEVER SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY DOES NOT
WANT INDIA TO SUBSCRIBE TO SAFEGUARDS WHICH COVER
ONLY PART OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LEADING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS POWERS. INDIAN SCIENTISTS SEE NO REASON
WHY THEIR ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE SHACKLED WHEN OTHERS
REMAIN FREE TO PURSUE ACTIVITIES UNIVERALLY REC-
OGNIZED TO BE DANGEROUS E.G. TESTING AND BOMB-
BUILDING.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BOMBAY 1652

8. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WAS HOPEFUL A STEP-BY-
STEP APPROACH MIGHT BE USEFUL IN RECONCILING
APPROACHES TO NON-PROLIFERATION. HE AGAIN REPLIED
THAT THIS QUESTION WAS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICALL ONE
BUT OBSERVED THAT OBVIOUSLY PARTNERS HAVE TO START
THE JOURNEY WITH TANDEM STEPS. IF THE U.S. AND
SOVIETS COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT THEN
INDIA WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO ABET THIS PROCESS.
HOWEVER HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSAL ADVANCED IN

NEW YORK FOR INDIA TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE U.S. TRIED TO WORK OUT MORE PROGRESS WITH RUSSIANS IS A NON-STARTER. ONCE INDIA ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS IT WILL EXPECT TO STICK WITH THEM FOREVER.

9. I POINTED OUT THAT THE INDIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY'S EMPHASIS ON TECHNICAL DISADVANTAGES OF SAFEGUARDS IS WIDELY VIEWS AS EXAGGERATED. THE COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE, COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS, ETC. ARE NOT THAT MUCH OF AN IMPEDIMENT IF ONE REALLY WANTS TO PURSUE NON-PROLIFERATION SERIOUSLY. SETHNA ADMITED THAT HIS COLLEGAUES TENDED TO BECOME EMOTIONAL ON SOME OF THESE POINTS. HE SAID CORE OF THEIR CONCERN IS CONFIDENTIAL

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U.S. POSITION ON REPROCESSING AS EXPRESSED IN NON-PROLIFERATION ACT. HE AGAIN SAID THAT SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IS CONVINCED THAT WE ARE TAKING DEAD AIM ON REPROCESSING WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO FAST-BREEDER PROGRAM. BEACUSE OF ITS LIMITED SUPPLY OF URANIUM INIA MUST HAVE A FAST-BREEDER PROGRAM IF IT IS TO HAVE AN EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM. I REPLIED THAT U.S. IS NOT TRYING TO ATTACK HIS BREEDER PROGRAM. I NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING ITS OWN RESEARCH ON REPROCESSING. WE SIMPLY WANT TO DEVELOP SAFE METHODS BEFORE REPROCESSING IS DONE ON A COMMERICAL SCALE.

10. HE SAID HE IS WATCHING CARFEULLY DEVELOPMENTS IN INFCE AS WELL AS OUR BILATERAL TALKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE HOPED THESE EXERCISES WOULD INDICATE SOLUTIONS FOR INDIA UBRKVSSMVR # WE ARE TO SEE EACH OTHER AGAIN IN WEEK FOLLOWING INDIAN ATOMIC COMMISSION'S MEETING OF JULY 12. COURTNEY

NOTE BY OC/T: BOMBAY 1652 SEC 2/2 PARA 10 LINE 4 AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

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Message Attributes

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